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Improving knowledge acquisition and dissemination 
through technological interventions on cognitive 
biases 
 
Sophie Stammers 
 
 
Abstract 
Several decades of research in cognitive science demonstrates that humans 
harbour systematic cognitive biases which can produce distortions of reality. 
These have a range of deleterious effects on multiple aspects of both teaching and 
learning. Whilst philosophers have discussed the possibility and desirability of 
technological epistemic enhancement of cognitive capacities that are already 
performing well, whether technological interventions might be used to mitigate 
cognitive biases is underexplored. In this paper, I investigate the use of future 
technological interventions to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias in education, 
and argue that utilising such interventions betters our epistemic position, and 
improves the quality of teaching and learning. I demonstrate that we should prefer 
targeted interventions on particular cognitions to interventions which halt heuristic 
processes. However, such interventions should not obscure important social 
information of relevance to educators. I suggest that interventions which enable 
the selective erasure of social biases should invite the user to consider the wider 
social and historical context of these biases, and demonstrate how this contributes 
to progress in research, and enhances the dissemination of knowledge in teaching 
and learning more generally.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Discussion of both the possibility and desirability of the use of technological 
developments to enhance human performance in a variety of domains occupies 
theorists across a wide range of disciplines. A subset of these technologies 
enhance the process of knowledge acquisition (“epistemic enhancement” after 
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Danaher) raising important questions for both educational theorists and 
practitioners.1 Much of the philosophical debate regarding technological 
enhancement in the epistemic realm concerns interventions on cognitive capacities 
that are already performing well, in order that they perform even better.2 These 
discussions are about extending the boundaries of human performance. However, 
several decades of research in cognitive science demonstrates that humans 
harbour systematic cognitive biases which can produce ill-grounded, distorted, or 
otherwise epistemically faulty cognitions. These have a range of deleterious 
effects on multiple aspects of both teaching and learning. Whilst philosophers 
have discussed the possibility and permissibility of technological epistemic 
enhancement of cognitive capacities that are already performing well, whether 
technological interventions might be used to mitigate cognitive biases is 
underexplored.3 
 In this paper, I investigate the use of future technological interventions to 
mitigate the effects of cognitive bias in education. I first consider current research 
which may pave the way for future technological cognitive interventions (Section 
1). I then introduce cognitive bias (Section 2), and focus on two examples, 
confirmation bias (2.1) and social bias (2.2), and justify why these are of 
particular concern in educational settings. In Section 3, I demonstrate that we can 
take two approaches: interventions which halt and redirect the processes which 
generate biased cognitions; and targeted interventions which aim to extinguish or 
                                                 
1 John Danaher, “On the Need for Epistemic Enhancement: Democratic Legitimacy and 
the Enhancement Project,” Law, Innovation and Technology 5, no. 1 (2013): 85–112. 
2 E.g. Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, 
Regulatory Challenges,” Science and Engineering Ethics 15, no. 3 (2009): 311–41.  
3 Discussion of technological interventions which play an ameliorative role has tended to 
focus on therapeutic applications, e.g. the use of propanol to reduce anxiety, which may 
have indirect epistemic benefits by making a person more comfortable in a learning 
environment; or the use of central nervous system stimulants to improve attention in 
learning environments for people with ADHD (Lawrence H. Diller, “The Run on Ritalin: 
Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in the 1990s,” The Hastings Center 
Report 25, no. 2 (1996).) There is less discussion of whether individuals could, and 
should, employ technological interventions to improve their systematically faulty 
cognition, regardless of whether they are neurotypical or not (although see Laura 
Klaming and Anton Vedder who consider the possibility of technological enhancement as 
regards eyewitness testimony and memory in “Brushing Up our Memories: Can We Use 
Neurotechnologies to Improve Eyewitness Testimony?” Law, Innovation and Technology 
1, no. 2 (2009): 203–221; and “Human Enhancement and the Common Good: Using 
Neurotechnologies to Improve Eyewitness Memory,” AJOB Neuroscience 1, no. 3 
(2010): 22–33; ).  
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overwrite individual biased cognitions. I argue that, because the processes that 
produce biased cognitions also regularly produce accurate cognitions, an 
intervention that halts these processes altogether will have the result that the 
person undergoing the intervention will find it difficult to form new beliefs and 
acquire further knowledge, an epistemically undesirable outcome. Targeted 
interventions are therefore preferable because they enable us to eliminate some 
biases, whilst leaving often useful heuristic processes intact. However, such 
interventions could have the result of obscuring information regarding social and 
historical injustices which in part explain differential achievements – information 
that is of vital import to effective teaching, for example, because it contextualises 
and justifies the provision of support. I suggest that interventions which enable the 
selective erasure of social biases should invite the user to consider the wider social 
and historical context of these biases, and demonstrate how this facilitates 
progress in research, and enhances the dissemination of knowledge in teaching 
and learning more generally.   
 
 
1. Kinds of technological epistemic enhancement 
 
Interventions with numerous different kinds of technologies may result in 
enhanced cognition that facilitates knowledge acquisition. The locus of interest in 
this section is not necessarily with technology that produces a distinctive form of 
technologically enhanced cognition. My concern is with identifying technological 
interventions that are reasonably novel, meaning that they have not been 
traditionally or commonly utilised, and the theoretical implications of their 
utilisation have not been extensively examined.4 In the following, I discuss two 
interventions of particular relevance to cognitive bias mitigation that may emerge 
with considerable technological advances. These are technologies of a futuristic 
neuroscience, but we should not delay debate about their desirability for bias 
mitigation until they are fully developed: that conversation is worth having now. 
 
1.2 Interfacing cognitive processes with computers 
                                                 
4 This concern is shared by others, e.g. Bostrum and Sangberg, op. cit., pp. 312-3. 
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Many forms of interfacing with computers with a view to enhancing cognition are 
reasonably mundane and commonplace: I’m engaging in one such case of 
interfacing right now, arranging and rearranging threads of sentences using a word 
processing programme with the aim of developing the structure of my argument, a 
process which would be much more arduous on paper. All sorts of computer and 
smart phone applications provide potential interfacing opportunities that can 
facilitate and enhance cognition. However, those who think proper interfacing 
requires an especially tight connection – preferably between neural networks and 
silicon circuits, will be pleased to hear that researchers are making some relevant 
inroads. One avenue of research demonstrates that implants can read neural 
signals so that a computer programme may visualize the activity of the neural 
network in question.5 Researchers are still some way from interpreting the content 
of representations across the network, but some envisage being able to do this one 
day.6 It’s conceivable, then, that the connection between mind and computer could 
become seamless, with the possibility that cognition is enhanced significantly 
through this direct integration with software. 
 
1.2 Direct neural manipulation  
Various forms of direct neural manipulation feature prominently in science 
fiction. For instance, in the film The Matrix, one of the characters directly 
“downloads” the know-how required to pilot a helicopter. Meanwhile, Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind features technology which enables the characters to 
have all of their memories of a lover who broke their heart to be located and 
deleted. Such technology, as least as regards the breadth and accuracy of these 
interventions, is somewhat fanciful. But, as above, that doesn’t mean it isn’t 
worthy of discussion. Moreover, recent developments in neuroscience suggest the 
beginnings of what Jiangyuan Hu calls “selective erasure,” which may be of 
                                                 
5 See Miguel Nicolelis et al. in “Chronic, multisite, multielectrode recordings in macaque 
monkeys,” Proceedings Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100, no. 19 
(2003): 11041–11046; see also Jose Carmena et al. “Learning to control a brain-machine 
interface for reaching and grasping by primates,” PLoSBiology 1, no. 2 (2003): 193–208. 
6 Miguel Nicolelis and Sidarta Ribeiro contemplate this in “Multielectrode Recordings: 
The Next Steps,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 12, no. 5 (2002): 602–6. 
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particular interest for our purposes in this paper.7 By blocking a specific protein, 
Hu and colleagues were able to reverse particular kinds of associations formed in 
memory. Further research led by Dheeraj Roy demonstrates that lost memories 
can be reconstructed by manipulating engram cells (suspected sites of memory 
storage).8 It is worth being clear that Hu et al.’s study participants were snails, 
whilst Roy et al.’s were mice. However, both groups of researchers are confident 
that their respective methods could, in the future, be utilized by humans, 
particularly in therapeutic applications (for treating anxiety or post-traumatic 
stress disorder; and Alzheimer’s respectively.9 We’ll discuss the implications of 
these findings in more detail in section 3.  
 
Let us now turn our attention to some systematically epistemically faulty 
cognitions that these interventions may serve to improve. 
 
 
2. Cognitive bias and knowledge acquisition 
 
Cartesian views in which our perceptual and cognitive systems typically represent 
reality as it is have generally fallen out of favour.10 For some, this undermines any 
possibility of any accurate representation,11 although others have countered these 
sorts of views, arguing that cognitive heuristics which result in some biased 
judgements develop for the reason that they deliver accurate representations 
overall.12 
There is no commonly agreed upon definition of cognitive bias. This is 
perhaps because there is much discussion over what it means for a cognition to be 
‘biased’. To be biased is to deviate from some prescribed (set of) norms(s), but 
                                                 
7 Jiangyuan Hu et al., “Selective Erasure of Distinct Forms of Long-Term Synaptic 
Plasticity Underlying Different Forms of Memory in the Same Postsynaptic Neuron,” 
Current Biology 27, no. 13 (2017): 1888–1899. 
8 Dheeraj Roy et al., “Memory Retrieval by Activating Engram Cells in Mouse Models of 
Early Alzheimer’s Disease,” Nature 531, no. 7595 (2016): 508–12. 
9 Hu et al., op. cit.; and Roy et al., op cit. respectively. 
10 See Andy Clark, Surfing uncertainty: prediction, action, and the embodied mind. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press (2016).  
11 Such as Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and method, New York: Continuum (1989). 
12 For instance, Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier in “Heuristic Decision 
Making,” Annual Review of Psychology 62, no. 1 (2011) 451–482.  
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which set of norms is at issue is hotly debated.13 For this reason, I prefer Haselton 
and colleagues’ definition which considers biases distortions of objective reality, 
without pronouncing on which norms they violate.14 According to Haselton et al., 
cognitive biases are: 
  
cases in which human cognition reliably produces representations that are 
systematically distorted compared to some aspect of objective reality.15 
 
Cognitive biases also affect how humans seek, interpret and form judgements 
about incoming information, resulting in further distortions.16  
  Let us turn to two commonly recognised types of cognitive bias: 
confirmation bias (2.1), and social bias (2.2). I show why each is of particular 
relevance to educational settings, and justify the need to discuss whether and how 
we should eliminate them through technological interventions should the 
possibility arise.  
 
2.1 Confirmation bias 
People are more likely to search for, and to accept, information that conforms with 
their existing beliefs and hypotheses than that which contradicts them. This 
tendency alone might not always deliver distorted cognitions, or distortion of the 
relevant features of the decision environment: If one’s existing beliefs correspond 
with reality, accepting information which coheres with these may well result in 
the adoption of beliefs which do correspond with reality. However, for most of us, 
in many circumstances, we will harbour at least some beliefs which do not 
correspond with reality, or, at least, which do not capture all of the relevant factors 
                                                 
13 For discussion, see Andrea Polonioli, “Adaptive Rationality, Biases, and the 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7, no. 4 (2016): 787–
803.  
14 Martie Haselton et al. “The Evolution of Cognitive Bias,” in The Handbook for 
Evolutionary Psychology, David M. Buss (Ed.) New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 
968–987. 
15 Ibid., p. 968. 
16 For discussion of different cognitive biases, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and 
slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2011). 
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in a decision environment. In these cases, confirmation bias is apt to shape our 
thinking.17 
Confirmation bias threatens learning in disciplines concerned with how 
things are in the world, and which centre on creating models that correspond with 
reality (e.g. the sciences and humanities). Take, for example, belief in the reality 
of anthropogenic climate change. The only considerations that ought to determine 
whether humans are causing increasing global temperatures and a changing 
climate are climate data. However, it turns out that existing political beliefs play a 
role in whether people accept the existence of anthropogenic climate change. 
People who are politically Conservative are significantly more likely to believe 
that anthropogenic climate change is not happening.18 The effect is present in 
those with increased levels of science comprehension,19 and is even seen among 
(non-climate) scientists,20 meaning that not just learners, but, potentially, 
educators (assuming at least some of the scientists in question also have teaching 
duties) are susceptible to confirmation biases in their practice.  
Confirmation bias in the above instance has been explained in part by 
people’s motivation to avoid inconsistency: people who are politically 
Conservative tend to support free-market economics, and are averse to market 
restrictions on commodities like fossil fuels. However, it is uncomfortable to 
admit that one champions something that has harmful results, and more 
comfortable to reject the existence of the harms in question. The risk that our 
values might in part determine which information we find persuasive and valuable 
presents considerable risk to many aspects of education (including primary, 
secondary, further and higher education): from determining the content included 
(and omitted) from curriculums (e.g. omitting meaningful study of colonialism 
from UK history curriculums because it does not cohere with one’s notion of 
British values); to the evaluation of student work and provision of feedback (high 
                                                 
17 Raymond Nickerson “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” 
Review of General Psychology 2, no. 2 (1998): 175-220. 
18 Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change and 
Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001-2010,” The 
Sociological Quarterly 52, (2011): 155–94. 
19 Dan Kahan, et al., “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on 
Perceived Climate Change Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 (2012): 732–35. 
20 J. Stuart Carlton, et al., “The Climate Change Consensus Extends beyond Climate 
Scientists,” Environmental Research Letters 10, no. 9 (2015): 94025.  
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marking workloads entail high time-pressure, which increases cognitive load – 
ideal conditions for the manifestation of biases such as conformation bias). As 
such, if we are interested in providing rigorous, comprehensive and applicable 
educational experiences, we ought to look into mitigating confirmation bias. 
 
2.2 Social bias  
People who profess to having egalitarian commitments, and who do not intend to 
discriminate, have been shown to nonetheless make unfavourable judgements 
about a person, or their accomplishments, on the basis of that person’s social 
group membership. Researchers explain these finding by proposing that we tend 
to associate certain social identity groups with certain stereotypical traits, and that 
these associations can manifest in cognition and lead us to misrepresent people by 
expecting them to comply with a stereotype that does not necessarily reflect 
reality.  
Researchers have described these as implicit social biases, although there 
is much discussion on exactly what is implicit about them, as well as how they are 
best measured.21 Social biases arise in a variety of teaching and learning 
environments.22 They are of particular relevance to educational theorists and 
practitioners, from an epistemic perspective, because they cause us to discount the 
scholarly contributions of people who do not fit the social stereotype associated 
with their field of knowledge, which could lead to distorted representations of 
academic progress in that field. 
People evaluate an error-ridden piece of writing less favourably when they 
believe it was written by an African American person compared to when they 
think the author is Caucasian.23 The piece of writing differs only for the name of 
                                                 
21 For an overview of the controversy surrounding (some) measurement paradigms see 
Jesse Singal’s piece “Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up to the 
Job,” (in The Cut (New York Magazine), published 11th January (2017), 
http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-tool-isnt-up-to-
the-job.html); and for a series of responses reinstating the existence of social bias and the 
need to combat it, see http://philosophyofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how-can-we-measure-
implicit-bias-a-brains-blog-roundtable.aspx. 
22 Guy Boysen and David Vogel, “Bias in the Classroom: Types, Frequencies, and 
Responses.” Teaching of Psychology 36, no. 1 (2009): 12–17; Cheryl Staats 
“Understanding Implicit Bias: What Educators Should Know,” American Educator, 
Winter (2015/6): 29–43.  
23 Arin Reeves “Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized 
Perceptions of Writing Skills,” Chicago: Nextions (2014).  
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the author, and so learning of the author’s race distorts one’s perception of the 
manuscript’s quality, leading to a belief that it is less accurate. Effects like these 
are important to educational theorists and practitioners in light of evidence that the 
attainment gap between ethnic minority and non-minority students is larger in the 
classes of more highly implicitly prejudiced teachers than that in the classes of 
lower prejudice teachers.24 Disvaluing intellectual contribution on the basis of 
social group membership is also shown to occur in academic research. One study 
demonstrated that university faculty across 259 institutions were more likely to 
reply to emails purporting to be from students requesting mentoring on a future 
research project if the email appeared to come from a white man, compared with 
those from a woman and/or ethnic minority correspondent.25 Again, researchers 
kept the email content fixed, with the text differing only for the name. In another 
case, a journal showed a significant increase in publications from female authors 
following the introduction of double-blind review, in which the social identity of 
the author is unknown to those involved in the editorial process.26 So, biases that 
lead to (at least partially) discounting cognitive contributions on the basis of social 
group membership undermine our pursuit of knowledge, particularly when such 
contributions further human enquiry, and could extend our understanding of the 
world if given appropriate credence.  
 
2.3 Good candidates for technological intervention 
There is much discussion over exactly how the cognitions involved in the biases 
discussed in the preceding sections should be characterised. Theorists sometimes 
identify them as unconscious, suggesting that we are unaware that the relevant 
judgements are distorted by cognitive biases, taking our attitudes to correspond 
well with reality. However, research suggests that in some circumstances people 
                                                 
24 Linda van den Bergh et al., “The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teachers,” Relations 
to Teacher Expectations and the Ethnic Achievement Gap, American Educaton Research 
Journal 47, no. 2 (2010) 497–527.  
25 Katherine Milkman et al., “What Happens before? A Field Experiment Exploring How 
Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 100, no. 6 (2015): 1678–1712. 
26 Amber Budden et al., “Double-Blind Review Favours Increased Representation of 
Female Authors,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 23, no. 1 (2008): 4–6.  
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might become aware of the influence of a bias on their behaviour.27 So, it might 
be better to think of them as typically unnoticed, but potentially available to 
reflection. Recognition of bias in one’s attitudes does not guarantee that a person 
will successfully overwrite the biased cognition immediately, or prevent its 
influence in reasoning, however. Such biases are typically difficult to control,28 or 
at least require reasonably effortful strategies to be brought under control.29 
Furthermore, as Lisa Bortolotti demonstrates, we have a tendency to believe we’re 
reasoning well, even when confronted with inconsistencies in our cognition.30 
Bortolotti draws upon on a range of studies demonstrating our tendency for 
preference reversal and decision procedure variance.31 For instance, altering 
whether one and the same disease management programme is described in terms 
of lives saved as opposed to lives lost alters peoples’ endorsement of that 
programme.32 However, evidence suggests people can be very resistant to 
changing their position when confronted regarding their preference variability and 
other inconsistencies in these sorts of decisions.33  
That recognition and control of bias requires effort and persistence doesn’t 
mean that there aren’t particular expectations on people to make the relevant 
efforts to bring biased cognition under control (as Holroyd and Kelly argue).34 But 
we still might enquire as to whether any other strategies might make the process 
easier and more effective, and turn our attention to whether technological 
interventions could help out. 
                                                 
27 See studies from Margo Monteith et al., “Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, 
Interpreting, and Reacting to Implicit Racial Biases,” Social Cognition 19, no. 4 (2001): 
395–417; and Adam Hahn et al., “Awareness of Implicit Attitudes,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 143, no. 3 (2014): 1369–92; and discussion by Jules 
Holroyd, “Implicit Bias, Awareness and Imperfect Cognitions, Consciousness and 
Cognition 33, (2015): 511–23.  
28 Neil Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press (2014). 
29 Jules Holroyd and Daniel Kelly, “Implicit Bias, Character, and Control,” In From 
Personality to Virtue, A. Masala and J. Webber (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2016).  
30 Lisa Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (2009). 
31 Ibid., Chapter 2. 
32 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and The Psychology 
of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458. 
33 Bortolotti, op. cit., p. 87. 
34 Holroyd and Kelly, op. cit.  
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It is worth outlining the scope of the argument and acknowledging other 
issues that I will not have space to explore here, but which have been explored 
more fully elsewhere. As previously highlighted, I’m interested in why we might 
be motivated to explore technological interventions on cognitive biases from an 
epistemic perspective – to improve the process of knowledge acquisition and 
sharing in educational settings. This raises the question of the sense in which 
people are thereby obligated to utilise technological interventions when available 
in educational settings, and invites a discussion of consent. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will assume that consent from the individual undergoing the 
intervention would be a requirement for proceeding.35 It is consistent with 
exploring technological interventions on cognitive biases from an epistemic 
perspective that other concerns (e.g., those from a moral perspective) might 
independently motivate this investigation, but I will not consider those here.36  
Others have cautioned that because novel technologies intended for 
enhancing any human capacity will come at some financial cost, their use will 
introduce unfair advantages for those able to afford these interventions, thereby 
disadvantaging those who cannot. I follow others in seeing these issues as 
symptomatic of a general problem of unfair resource distribution that is 
perpetuated under dominant economic systems, rather than a particular issue for 
novel technological interventions.37 Whilst there is only space here to recommend 
technological interventions from an epistemic perspective, someone taking 
forwards these recommendations would want to consider these practical issues 
more fully.  
 
 
3. Epistemic considerations for technological interventions 
 on cognitive biases 
                                                 
35 One might argue that the same considerations which obligate people in positions of 
power (e.g. employers) to take implicit bias training might also obligate their use of novel 
technological interventions, and that this also applies to educators. But a fuller discussion 
would be necessary before proceeding. 
36 For a discussion of using technological enhancement to extend our moral capacities, 
see Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the 
Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity,” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2008): 162–177. 
37 For discussion, see Bostrum and Sandberg, op. cit.  
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In this section, I demonstrate that there are two ways in which we might utilise 
technology to intervene on cognitive biases, and then assess the desirability of 
these interventions for facilitating knowledge acquisition. The first kind of 
intervention acts on the processes which produce distorted representations. The 
second acts on individual representations. We’ll discuss them in that order. 
 
3.1 Halting biased processes 
Recall the discussion from section 1 in which technologies of a future 
neuroscience can interpret and interact with the representation of information 
across a neural network. This might occur via sophisticated neural-interfacing 
implants (as in 1.1) that are able to scan the network’s activity at a fine enough 
grain that software interfacing with the network can decode the representations 
and processes running on it. Let’s also suppose that the interfacing device is able 
to manipulate representations, and to halt, redirect, or initiate processes (as in 
1.2).38 Now, we can programme our software to detect any process on the network 
that has resulted in a distorted representation (such as when the network utilizes a 
heuristic, or jumps to a conclusion that isn’t properly supported by other 
representations in the network) and, via the interface, redirect the network to run 
processes that will result in a non-distorted representation instead.  
Call the intervention described above the “Heuristic Terminator.” By 
intervening, halting and redirecting the processes which generate cognitive biases, 
the Heuristic Terminator ensures that the neural network that will not produce the 
distorted representations which, as we saw above, can thwart our acquisition of 
knowledge. Use of the Heuristic Terminator would thereby significantly enhance 
knowledge acquisition in a previously typically cognitively-biased person, 
enabling them to avoid the distorted cognitions discussed in section 2.  
In principle, this all sounds good. However, once we start thinking more 
about how the Heuristic Terminator’s software would work, together with the 
limitations of the existing “wet-ware”, we run into some trouble. As we saw in 
2.1, heuristic reasoning does not always result in distorted cognition. Sometimes, 
                                                 
38 We don’t have a story to tell about the details here yet, but, as suggested in section 1, 
we should not have to wait for an innovation to be available before debating whether – 
and how – it is worth utilising. 
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it leads to further beliefs which do correspond with reality. So, it’s not the case 
that terminating any heuristic process will kill off all and only the distorted 
cognitions. It may also result in the extinction of accurate representations.  
It will be helpful at this point to consider why we tend to rely on heuristics 
and other cognitive shortcuts in the first place. Human information processing 
capacities are limited, but the information in our environment that is possibly 
relevant to cognition is extensive, and far outweighs processing capacity. Using 
heuristics enables us to more easily identify information that might be relevant, 
and enables us to terminate enquiry without having to consider every possibly 
relevant piece of information. It’s likely that a vast quantity of human information 
processing relies on heuristics.39   
It is unclear whether the Heuristic Terminator could differentiate a 
heuristic that typically delivers accurate cognitions from one that doesn’t. If its 
instruction to the neural network is to terminate all heuristic processes, and to 
demand that all representations are arrived at in a way that guarantees their 
reliability, then we might end up with a system that simply stops forming any 
further representations because the threshold for establishing an accurate 
representation of the world is too high to be met with existing cognitive resources. 
In that scenario, one would regularly find oneself unable to form new beliefs. So, 
interfacing with the Heuristic Terminator would likely be a rather uncomfortable 
and disorientating experience. We’ve not arrived at a place where knowledge 
acquisition is facilitated – quite the opposite. The Heuristic Terminator has 
created the ultimate skeptic.   
It might be suggested that if the problem is that human processing 
capacities are limited, then the solution is to use the Heuristic Terminator in 
conjunction with another technological intervention that significantly augments 
processing capacity. This could occur through further interfacing, in which 
processing is offloaded from the low-capacity wetware and distributed across a 
much higher capacity artificial processor. Then, we’d have a substantially 
upgraded processor to support the operations necessary for forming accurate 
representations without relying on heuristic processes. 
                                                 
39 See Thomas Gilovich et al. (eds.) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive 
judgment, Cambridge University Press (2002) for a series of essays on this topic. 
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Using this intervention, we would be able to form new beliefs, whilst 
avoiding cognitive biases. However, one might now wonder exactly how much 
human is left in this extensive labyrinth of interfacing.40 Suffice to say, this option 
constitutes a somewhat radical enhancement. It might be that in the future, 
humans will regularly use interfaces for a range of applications, and so this 
proposal will be more mundane for them than it seems to us now. But further to 
that, the solution we’ve created here is rather inelegant. In ensuring that cognitive 
biases do not arise in the system, we’ve had to remove a significant part of what 
the system does well, only to bolt on a non-human module to meet the demand 
necessary to replicate those epistemically useful processes. Perhaps there is a less 
round-about, less radical way to achieve the same effects.  
 
3.2 Targeted interventions  
If heuristic processes in general bring epistemic benefits as well as costs, then 
perhaps a better arrangement than the Heuristic Terminator is an intervention 
which targets just those representations which typically result in distorted 
cognitions when recruited in processing. In fact, some cognitive scientists employ 
current technological interventions with the aim of achieving this targeted effect. 
A canonical example comes from pioneer of research into implicit cognition, 
Mahzarin Banaji, who has made a screensaver that cycles through a thousand 
pictures of counter-stereotypical images of people, with two main aims: (i) to 
combat stereotypical associations between concepts that are overemphasised by 
biased sources (e.g., a media that overemphasises the association between black 
people and criminality);41 and (ii) to give her access to representations of people 
and their life experiences beyond the scope of her normal perspective. Her 
intention is that (i) enables her cognitive system to gradually uncouple 
                                                 
40 It might be thought that the discovery that heuristics are embedded in our cognition 
already undermines the essence of human thought, but it is not clear that this follows: it 
has been argued that such processes are in fact fundamental to interpreting our 
experiences and building our understanding of the world (e.g. Gadamer, op. cit.). 
41 A report on representations of black men in the media by The Opportunity Agenda 
found that negative associations tend to be exaggerated, whilst positive associations tend 
to be limited (2011, 13-14) URL: http://racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/Media-Impact-
onLives-of-Black-Men-and-Boys-OppAgenda.pdf  
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stereotypical associations; whilst (ii) allows her to instil new representations about 
people she would otherwise know little about, so that she is less likely to rely on 
inaccurate stereotypes of their life and experiences.42 
 Speaking of these sorts of interventions, Banaji says:  
 
I no longer believe that I can just let information into my mind as it comes. I 
believe I must choose and edit… I actually am pleased that the way 
technology now allows me to craft what I want to watch and listen to…”43  
 
It has been pointed out that these sorts of interventions require continued effort, 
and even then, may not rid someone completely of a distorted representation. Neil 
Levy maintains that it remains “controversial” as to whether interventions like 
those suggested by Banaji enable the overwriting of distortions in a manner that is 
“relatively rapid” or “arduous, slow and extremely uncertain”.44 So, one might be 
interested in whether future technologies may enhance this effortful and uncertain 
process. 
As introduced in 1.4, Hu and colleagues’ developments in “selective 
erasure,” which aim to target particular associations in memory, might be the 
basis of one such intervention. As before, we can imagine that we’re operating 
under a somewhat futuristic neuroscience, in which neural manipulation 
technology can search for specific associations between concepts, and can then 
selectively erase them, leaving accurate information regarding the concepts in 
question intact. Let’s also that imagine that our intervention is able to overwrite or 
implant new representations (as in Roy et al., also discussed in 1.4). Call this 
intervention the “Selective Manipulator”. Let’s now consider how it might work. 
Recall, Reeves’ findings that people judge one and the same piece of 
writing to be more error-ridden when they believe it to have been written by an 
African American person than by a Caucasian person.45 By selectively erasing the 
association linking African Americans and academic underachievement, the 
                                                 
42 This technique was used in Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald, “On the 
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of 
Admired and Disliked Individuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 
5 (2001): 800–814. 
43 Mahzarin Banaji in an interview with Krista Tippett, On Being, 9th June, 2016. 
44 Levy, op. cit., pp. 99. 
45 Reeves, op. cit. 
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Selective Manipulator could prevent distorted judgements of the accuracy of 
writing perceived to be by African Americans from occurring in this case. The 
Selective Manipulator could also be used to target associations between women 
and academic underachievement to prevent the kind of distorted judgements 
discussed in section 2.2.46  
The Selective Manipulator will be useful when it enables the deletion of a 
biased association that might otherwise become active in cognition to produce 
biased judgements. For instance, consider two teachers who habour an association 
between the concepts male and rationality who are grading the quality of 
students’ arguments. For the teacher whose association remains intact, that 
association is apt to distort their perception of argument quality (leading them to 
mark one and the same argument as of a higher quality when they believe it was 
written by a boy, as compared to a girl); whilst this risk is removed for the teacher 
whose association has been selectively deleted. One might think that simply 
anonymising student work produces the same result, but knowing who produced 
which piece of work whilst marking is pedagogically valuable, for it enables 
teachers to tailor the tone of their feedback (some students do better with frank, 
straightforward feedback, whilst for others this tone is not constructive).  
We have so far considered associations between social identity and 
particular aptitudes. But what about cases in which teachers favour contributions 
which reflect the dominant culture, and undervalue contributions which support 
non-dominant cultures? For instance, in a politics class, a student raised with 
Western values, with an emphasis on individualism, might praise the 
individualistic aspects of a political system, whilst a student raised in a culture 
that places more emphasis on collectivism might criticize those aspects of a 
political system, and a Western teacher might unfairly undervalue the second 
student’s contribution. Whilst there is much empirical work on how associations 
regarding dominant social identity categories bias cognition, there is less on how 
dominant ideologies produce bias in cognition, and so it would be premature to 
pronounce on how the Selective Manipulator would work in these cases. If it turns 
out that, alike social stereotypes, dominant ideologies are upheld through a series 
of discrete evaluations (in which, for example, facets of individualism are 
                                                 
46 Those revealed in Milkman et al., op. cit.; and Budden et al., op. cit. 
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positively valenced, whilst those of collectivism negatively valenced), then it is 
possible that these may also be targeted by the Selective Manipulator. It could be 
that there is less public agreement on whether these cases count as bias, because 
they may well be viewed through the lens of the dominant ideology, and 
communication around such cases would need to be careful. But public push-back 
against current de-biasing efforts is common, and managing this is another 
practical issue to be considered before using the Selective Manipulator.47  
Not everyone may support the use of the Selective Manipulator. For 
instance, those who espouse the “mirror view” of the above attitudes might object 
that this use of the Selective Manipulator will not have the intended epistemically 
beneficial outcomes promised above. According to the mirror view, social biases 
aren’t really biases at all, but reflect real-life propensities. Nilanjana Dasgupta, for 
instance, suggests that implicit attitudes are “mirror-like reflections of local 
environments and communities within which individuals are immersed,” and that 
“Through repetition, these observations get passively recorded in the mind and 
become the basis of implicit attitudes and beliefs”.48 For instance, African 
Americans do underachieve in some educational settings as compared with 
Caucasians and it is this fact that causes an association with underachievement, 
but social, economic and political factors (such as reduced access to education and 
financial resources) explain this underachievement.49 Nonetheless, for proponents 
of the mirror view, reality is reflected in a cognition that links African Americans 
with underachievement.50 Following the mirror view, Tamar Gendler has argued 
that implicit social attitudes aren’t really biases at all, because they reflect real-
world propensities, and that in rejecting them, one loses important accurate 
                                                 
47 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to consider these sorts of cases. 
48 pp. 240-1 in “Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to Situations: A Decade of Research 
on the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-Concept,” Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 47, (2013): 233–279. 
49 Indeed, Tyrone Howard demonstrates both this differential achievement, and that 
multiple factors (including the prejudicial attitudes and differential treatment from 
educators) account for these findings in “Who Really Cares? The Disenfranchisement of 
African American Males in PreK-12 Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective,” 
Teachers College Record 110, no. 5 (2008) 954–985. 
50 See also Sally Haslanger, “Social Structure, Narrative, and Explanation,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 1 (2015), 1–15. 
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representations of the world.51 If this is right, then from an epistemic point of 
view, these cognitions ought to be preserved after all.  
However, a number of other philosophers have argued that the situation is 
more nuanced than the mirror view would have it. Alex Madva, for instance, 
maintains that the mirror view is “a radically oversimplified and misleading gloss 
on the psychology of prejudice,” pointing to evidence that our social 
representations of the world are partly reinforced and maintained by the way we 
want to see the world.52 For instance, one study shows that men were more critical 
of findings indicating a bias against hiring women in science, whilst women were 
more critical of findings indicating an absence of such a bias.53 In short, 
confirmation bias driven by the desire to, for instance, downplay the structural 
benefits that have given one advantages over members of another group, feeds and 
maintains our implicit social biases.  
Further, one might hold something like a mirror view of implicit 
associations, but argue that use of the Selective Manipulator is nevertheless 
epistemically recommended. Katherine Puddifoot maintains that even if our 
implicit social attitudes do reflect real world propensities (e.g. associating science 
with men simply because there are more prominent male scientists) their tendency 
to feature in so much other processing that results in further distorted cognition 
outweighs the epistemic benefit of reflecting real-world propensities.54 For 
instance, an association between black people and underachievement may reflect 
reality, but it is apt to be activated automatically by stimuli evoking black people, 
and to generate distorted judgements in instances where this association should 
not have any normative force: Even if it’s true that black people tend to 
underperform in some academic pursuits compared with people from other racial 
backgrounds, that’s not a reason for seeing more errors in one and the same piece 
of writing when it is associated with a black author compared to a white author – 
                                                 
51 Tamar Szabó Gendler, “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias,” Philosophical 
Studies 156, no. 1 (2011): 33–63.  
52 P. 719 in “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads 
Social Policy,” Ergo 3 (2016): 701–738. These motivations might be unconscious, or, at 
least, relatively unreflective, and available only through careful self-observation. 
53 Ian Handley et al., “Quality of Evidence Revealing Subtle Gender Biases in Science Is 
in the Eye of the Beholder,” National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 43 (2015): 13201–
13206, in Madva, op. cit., 719. 
54 Katherine Puddifoot, “Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma over Implicit Bias.” 
Philosophical Explorations 20, sup.1 (2017): 73–93.  
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and yet, that is what people believe they see, constituting a real risk for 
perpetuating stereotypes in educational settings.55 Puddifoot argues that the 
epistemic benefits of maintaining the association are outweighed by these 
downstream epistemic costs, and so we’d do better epistemically if we rejected the 
association. So, the epistemic considerations which motivate the mirror view 
(reflecting reality) may still be compatible with the use of the Selective 
Manipulator.  
 Whilst I am convinced by Madva and Puddifoot’s arguments that the 
epistemic characteristics of implicit biases are not exhausted by pointing to the 
ways in which they reflect society, I am also sympathetic to a concern raised by 
many who espouse mirror view: that the relevant social stereotypes are connected 
to deep and pervasive structural issues that we should not lose sight of in 
discussions of cognitive bias.56 This concern may well count against the use of the 
Selective Manipulator as a method to extinguish implicit social biases in favour of 
advancing learning – or, at least, it will determine that the Manipulator is used in 
conjunction with other resources. If the Selective Manipulator allows users to 
effectively delete their biases without acknowledging their content, their source, 
or their part in perpetuating structural injustices, then it takes away an important 
opportunity to engage learners and educators, facilitating their recognition of the 
structures which constrain the trajectories of knowledge acquisition.  
Consider again Reeves’ finding that a piece of writing is evaluated more 
harshly when participants believe the author is African American than when 
Caucasian.57 Whilst in these sorts of judgements, the manifestation of the 
association is inappropriate, participants harbour this association in part because 
African American students generally do underachieve as compared with 
Caucasian peers – but this attainment gap exists due to historical structural 
injustices which deprive African American communities of resources necessary to 
develop academic success.58 The association itself does not contain information 
                                                 
55 Reeves, op. cit.  
56 Haslanger, op. cit. There is disagreement about the nature of the connection – those 
who espouse the mirror view think injustice in the structure of society is primarily 
responsible for the formation of stereotypes in cognition, whilst some respondents to the 
mirror view like Madva think that there is feedback, with the cognitive stereotypes 
reinforcing unjust structures, and those structures reinforcing the stereotypes. 
57 Reeves, op. cit. 
58 Howard, op. cit. 
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about historical structural injustice which explains the achievement differential. 
However, confronting the fact that one harbours negative associations about 
African Americans presents an opportunity to deepen one’s understanding of 
these structural issues. This could prove particularly important for teachers. In this 
case it contextualises and justifies the provision of support to African Americans 
pupils. Extinguishing the relevant association through the Selective Manipulator 
removes this pedagogically significant opportunity.  
Even Sally Haslanger, who cautions against expending too many 
philosophical resources on the discussion of the cognitive aspects of bias, points 
out that “drawing attention to implicit bias can be strategically useful as a starting 
point for discussion of social injustice because there is empirical evidence to 
support the claim that we are all biased.”59 But with the Selective Manipulator, the 
opportunity for discussion does not necessarily arise, and so we miss out on 
discussing important structural issues. 
This doesn’t entail that we shouldn’t use the Selective Manipulator at all – 
it still might be the most effect method for preventing the distorted cognitions 
which thwart educational goals as discussed in 2.2. But we should act to preserve 
the opportunity to turn attention to unjust structures that comes for free with 
traditional implicit bias interventions. So, I propose that, to preserve these 
pedagogically important opportunities, it should be the case that the Selective 
Manipulator is designed so that it requires users to confront the content of their 
biases, and how they have figured in cognition, and simultaneously provide them 
with information on the wider social and historical context which they are invited 
to engage with. 
 One might think this suggestion is motivated egalitarian concerns, rather 
than epistemic concerns. But greater attention to the structures that reinforce 
implicit social biases not only works towards egalitarian goals, but also facilitates 
achieving the epistemic goals discussed in 2.2, in turn promoting better teaching 
and learning. If we wish to see progress in various fields of knowledge acquisition 
and dissemination, we should not erroneously discount the scholarly contributions 
of people who do not fit the social stereotype associated with a particular field of 
knowledge. Structural barriers at the heart of mirror theorists’ concerns also create 
                                                 
59 Haslanger, op. cit., p. 12. 
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barriers to development in the field of knowledge. Amia Srinivasan has argued 
forcefully for this point regarding progress in philosophy, for instance. She 
maintains that all philosophy is value-laden.60 Even in logic and proof theory we 
appeal to values such as simplicity and elegance, for instance. And, which values 
get to be designated as desirable within a discipline is in part a matter of cultural 
and historical standards. Srinivasan says: 
 
…once we recognise that the outputs of our philosophical theorising are 
radically shaped by how, where and with whom we are thrown into the 
world, then we will see the philosophical pressure to diversify philosophy. A 
homogenous discipline means a homogenous set of ideas, a homogenous set 
of intellectual products and projects. If our goal is to collectively explore 
logical space, collectively seek the truth, then a genealogically homogenous 
search party won’t be particularly good at the job.61  
 
So, disallowing people to participate in pursuing and extending knowledge 
acquisition on the basis that they do not fit the dominant social stereotype of that 
discipline isn’t a neutral action as regards progress in that discipline. Scholars 
who have homogenous social and cultural experiences may advance their 
discipline in fewer directions than a more heterogeneous workforce.62  
One may think this is only true in select subjects – science isn’t value 
laden, for instance, or so the reply goes. But that isn’t so clearly true. Even in 
science scholars make decisions about which phenomena are worthy of scientific 
investigation; which discoveries are worthy of acknowledgement and attention in 
standardised cannon; and which examples from the cannon are taught. For 
example, in medicine, a historically male discipline, the contemporary research 
                                                 
60 Amia Srinivasan, “Does feminist philosophy rest on a mistake?” Keynote address to the 
KCL Minorities and Philosophy Conference, 4th July (2015). Transcript available at: 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_files/Does%20Feminist%20Philosophy_KCL
%20talk.pdf 
61 Ibid. 
62 It is worth clarifying that Srinivasan’s view is not relativism about accurate 
understanding of the world, but rather, that our epistemological project to achieve 
accurate understanding is more effectively served when it draws on the participation of 
people with different experiential starting points. 
 22
agenda still proceeds along a gendered trajectory.63 The sciences are disciplines 
which purport to offer comprehensive models of reality, not reality as modelled 
from the perspective of some subset of society, and so diverse experiences are 
integral to setting the course for how, and into what, scientific enquiry proceeds. 
As such, from an epistemic perspective (as well as from a moral one) we ought to 
be aware of, and interested in dismantling the structures that perpetuate 
marginalisation and prevent diversification in places of research, teaching and 
learning. 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the foregoing, I argued that because cognitive biases bring about distorted 
cognitions, they thwart goals of knowledge acquisition and dissemination, and so 
educators have a strong interest in their mitigation. Future technological 
interventions have the potential to enhance bias mitigation. I argued that an 
intervention that halts the processes that lead to distorted cognitions, the Heuristic 
Terminator, will not serve to facilitate knowledge acquisition because heuristic 
processes often result in accurate cognitions, and without them, we would find it 
very difficult to make sense of decision environments. So, a more targeted 
approach was favoured: the Selective Manipulator, which erases particular 
associations that lead to distorted cognitions.  
I defended the use of the Selective Manipulator in the face of a challenge 
from the mirror view, but argued that we should take seriously the idea that 
structural barriers to participation are worthy of our attention, and showed how 
they can hinder the progression of knowledge expansion and dissemination. Since 
moral and epistemic aims converge on engendering an understanding of structural 
                                                 
63 For instance, there is a significant lack of research into endometriosis, as well as into 
uterine fibroids – both gynaecological conditions – compared to other diseases with 
similarly debilitating symptoms. (Geoffrey Adamson et al., “Creating solutions in 
endometriosis: Global collaboration through the World Endometriosis Research 
Foundation,” Journal of Endometriosis 2, no. 1 (2010) 3–6; L Amanti, et al., “Uterine 
Leiomyoma and Its Association with Menstrual Pattern and History of Depo-
Medroxyprogesterone Acetate Injections,” International Journal of General Medicine 4, 
(2011): 535-8.) 
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injustice, the use of the Selective Manipulator presents an opportunity to host a 
public conversation about the origins of the relevant biases in the unjust structures 
which they also act to uphold. Accordingly, if the Selective Manipulator is to be 
used for the purpose of facilitating epistemic goals discussed in 2.2, we ought to 
ensure we preserve the opportunity for understanding structural injustices.  
 The discussion was mostly as regards social biases here, but there is a 
broader lesson. Technological interventions such as direct neural manipulation 
take us out of a more organic learning environment where enquiry can lead off 
tangentially and allow one to make new discoveries which in turn lead to 
epistemic progression. When future technological interventions promise cognitive 
shortcuts, they may serve to facilitate epistemic goals. But we should also 
consider what we might have learned if we’d gone the long way around, and if 
necessary, factor this into our use of the technological intervention.  
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